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Peter Berkowitzt
The common sense that advises against judging a book by its cover also
instructs us to observe the judgments that the cover of a book makes. The
grim, out-of-focus black-and-white photograph of columns of troops marching
through a wide city street on the dust jacket of The Anatomy of Antiliberalism,
which serves as a backdrop for the blood-red letters of the book's title,
insinuates an ominous alliance. The indistinct photograph, entitled Russian
Revolutionary Parade, 1917, suggests a connection between illiberal
revolutionary politics and the critics of liberalism whom Stephen Holmes puts
on trial in his new work. Holmes reinforces this connection in his opening
lines by declaring that contemporary academic criticisms of liberalism reflect
"muted versions" of the outlook that animated Stalin and Hitler, and he
emphasizes that the nefarious political history of the "disparagement of
'liberalism"' casts a menacing shadow over criticism of liberalism in the
present.' Yet, a few pages later, Holmes carefully disavows the comparison
between fascist thought and the writings that he brings together and condemns
* Professor of Political Science and Law, University of Chicago.
t Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University.
1. STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM xi (1993) [hereinafter THE ANATOMY OF
ANTILIBERAUSM].
1363
The Yale Law Journal
under the rubric of antiliberalism. Exculpating through patronizing insult,
Holmes stresses that the American professors whom he criticizes are naive and
politically irrelevant.2 Which is to be believed? The vulgar accusation implicit
in the cover, or the cautiously qualified statement of intent set forth in the
preface? Which indication is to be credited? The link between the politics of
Hitler and Stalin and the academic criticism of liberalism declared by the
opening paragraph, or Holmes' earnest insistence only two pages later that he
does not "indulge in guilt by association"? 3 Is Holmes a polemicist or a
scholar?
Holmes, a professor of political science and law at the University of
Chicago, seeks to defend liberalism against its most prominent academic
critics. On the theory that the best defense is a good offense, Holmes comes
out swinging, relentlessly pummeling members of what he calls the "anti-
liberal" tradition.4 Holmes uses the first part of his book to assemble a rogues'
gallery of antiliberals and, author by author, argues that the thought of each
rogue is incoherent, utopian, and based on a crude misreading of classic liberal
thinkers. In the second part of the book, Holmes identifies a number of
common criticisms of liberalism and argues that each loses its force when
viewed in light of the actual teachings of classic liberals.5
Holmes is a vigorous writer and an incisive thinker whose liberalism is
ardent and unapologetic. As a polemic, his book is a smashing success. The
Camille Paglia of liberalism, Holmes is never at a loss for the colorful insult,
the witty put-down, or the bitingly sarcastic aside. However, Holmes does not
know where to draw the line between bold rhetoric and shady sensationalism.
A proud liberal, Holmes presumably is committed to the liberal virtue that he
extols, a "willingness to listen to others."6 He explicitly proclaims that he
wants to succeed on the basis of criticism that is "well-documented and fair;"7
accordingly, he deplores arguments that lack evidence. 8 It is ironic, then, that
the success of Holmes' polemical defense of liberal principles owes much to
ignoring what his opponents actually say, to criticism that is poorly document-
ed, and to ugly innuendo unsupported by evidence.
Indeed, as a scholarly work, Holmes' book is quite uneven. In criticizing
liberalism's critics, Holmes exaggerates real ambiguities into outright
contradictions, rips snippets from his opponents' works so as to put in their
mouths crude views that they do not defend, and weaves together half-truths
to caricature the opinions he purports to examine fairly. In contrast, in
2. Id. at xiii.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2-3.
5. Among the classic liberals Holmes counts Spinoza, Milton, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Voltaire,
Becaria, Blackstone, Smith, Kant, Madison, Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. Id. at 3, 187-88.
6. Id. at 223, 227.
7. Id. at xvi.
8. Id. at 126.
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reconstructing the spirit of classical liberalism, Holmes generously supplies
missing historical information or textual detail to make sense of and vindicate
the views that he supports. This combination of mean-spiritedness toward his
enemies and charity toward his friends is a double standard that permits
Holmes to vulgarize his opponents' views while interpreting liberal arguments
in the most favorable light. Not only liberals, but all who love ideas and
cherish fair play should be embarrassed by the unscrupulous methods Holmes
employs to defend liberalism.
Nevertheless, in evaluating Holmes' achievement one must not repeat his
errors. Despite his book's grave shortcomings, there can be little doubt that
Holmes has made a timely contribution to the retrieval of a more nuanced,
historically informed, and vital liberalism than the one currently on display in
most scholarly writings. Liberalism needs a spirited and intelligent champion,
and has found one in Holmes. Yet liberalism in particular needs a champion
who is also principled. Holmes does not live up to his promise because his
partisan passion impairs his judgment. He not only fails to appreciate fully the
service rendered to liberalism by liberalism's critics, but takes extraordinary
measures to conceal that service from view. Although Holmes wisely observes
that viewing public disagreement as a creative force "may have been the most
novel and radical principle of liberal politics," 9 he fails to appreciate the cre-
ative force stemming from thinkers who attempt to take a step back from liber-
alism and criticize it whole. Holmes' oversight reflects, among other things,
a failure of self-understanding, for his admirable ambition to retrieve the lost
classical meaning of liberalism is in part a reaction to, and inconceivable
without, the provocations provided by liberalism's critics.
Because Holmes proudly defends liberalism against oft-repeated charges,
liberals are likely to find themselves enthusiastically cheering Holmes on.
Those sympathetic to the thinkers Holmes attacks are bound to be outraged by
Holmes' repeated insinuation that liberalism's critics are a collection of
megalomaniacs, cranks, and quacks. A more subtle response will come from
a third type-a type, it should be noted, that Holmes' rigid dichotomy between
liberals and "enemies of liberalism"' systematically excludes. Unlike those
who fall neatly into the categories of "us" and "them" into which Holmes
aggressively divides Western political thought, friends of liberalism whose
understanding has been enriched by ideas and traditions beyond liberalism's
boundaries will be compelled to seek a more balanced judgment of Holmes'
book, a judgment based on a recognition of both the virtues and the vices of
Holmes' spirited defense of liberalism.
To form that judgment, I survey, in Part I of this Review, Holmes' account
of antiliberal thinkers and his pointed reply on behalf of liberalism. In
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id. at 16; see also id. at 4.
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particular, I call attention to the illiberal temper of Holmes' criticism of
liberalism's critics. Next, I illustrate one of the disadvantages to liberalism
arising from Holmes' overuse of the category "antiliberal" by exploring how
Holmes vigorously mischaracterizes Leo Strauss as an enemy of liberalism.
Finally, building on Holmes' own insight into the liberal spirit of toleration
and the essential emphasis that liberalism places on basic political institutions,
I suggest, contrary to the spirit of Holmes' argument, that one of liberalism's
virtues is its ability to derive support from heterodox traditions of thought.
I. HOLMES' ANTILIBERALISM
Holmes' distinctive claim is that there is a tradition of non-marxist
antiliberal thought, or simply antiliberalism. Holmes insists that the thinkers
he examines are "kindred spirits" who "share a radical sensibility."" There
are profound disagreements among them, Holmes acknowledges, but this
merely reveals "the multiple faces of a single tradition."' 2 Holmes' readers
might be puzzled to note that none of these thinkers ever identified himself as
a member of the antiliberal tradition that Holmes attempts to reconstruct.
Nevertheless, Holmes argues, antiliberalism has a recognizable shape. Antilib-
erals "define their common enemy almost identically ... as the secular
humanism of the Enlightenment,"' 3 and antiliberalism is marked by inatten-
tion to the intellectual pedigree of its ideas in European fascism and the
Catholic reaction to the Enlightenment, 4 its advocacy of unrealistic political
alternatives, 5 and its deployment of internally incoherent arguments.' 6 Not
only are antiliberals bound together by a common hostility to Enlightenment
thought, but they also share an uncompromising opposition to liberal politics,
"display[ing] a uniform contempt for liberal institutions and ideas."' 7
Liberalism properly understood, Holmes argues, stands for religious toleration,
freedom of speech, personal security, individual liberty, democratic partic-
ipation, and constitutional government based on a separation of powers."
Nevertheless, Holmes charges, antiliberals tend to bypass analysis of liberal
political institutions and practices in favor of Kulturkritik, blaming liberalism
for the allegedly degraded culture and empty spiritual life that has grown up
under its care.19
II. Id. at 10.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 13.
14. Id. at xiv.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 13.
18. Id. at 3-4.
19. Id. at 4-5.
1366 [Vol. 103: 1363
Liberal Zealotry
Holmes begins his examination of the antiliberal mind with chapters on
Joseph de Maistre and Carl Schmitt. His stated aim is to bring to light the
"impressive historical pedigree" of antiliberalism. 0 Holmes' most important
achievement in these opening chapters on the Catholic reactionary Maistre and
the former Nazi Schmitt is the establishment of a disconcerting affinity
between arguments deployed today by academic critics of liberalism and those
developed by earlier thinkers who were extremists with unsavory affiliations.
Yet Holmes goes far beyond noting conceptual likeness, claiming that Maistre
directly inspired later antiliberal thought. Thus, Holmes declares, Maistre is
"one of the principal shapers of the antiliberal mentality"; 2 "Maistre did as
much as any early writer to determine the lineaments of the antiliberal
mind";22 and Maistre "helped mold as well as inspire the antiliberal move-
ment."23 Yet Holmes does not provide evidence that Strauss, Unger,
MacIntyre, Lasch, or the communitarian critics of liberalism read or were
influenced by Maistre's writings.2' Indeed, Holmes inflates the significance
of his important observation about the disturbing similarities between politi-
cally disreputable and currently fashionable criticisms of liberalism by
fabricating a causal connection out of thin air. Holmes' fallacious argument
would suggest that two people who look alike must spring from the same
parents and share the same character.
From Maistre and Schmitt, Holmes proceeds to Leo Strauss. Holmes
correctly stresses that "Strauss's debt to Nietzsche was profound."' Yet, once
again inferring a direct and simple cause-and-effect relationship from an
interesting conceptual affinity, Holmes makes the unsubstantiated claim that
specific illiberal passages from Nietzsche's work "provided the seed that
eventually grew into Strauss' idea of a perennial conflict between 'philosophy'
and 'the city."' 2 6 Strauss, according to Holmes, was an atheist who believed
that religion was a political necessity for the masses, a myth that should be
maintained by the few to anesthetize the multitude against the brutal, hard truth
that God is dead. Holmes charges that Strauss, a radically aristocratic phi-
losopher masquerading as a scholar, was undemocratic and illiberal in the
sense that Strauss believed that the few like himself who were philosophers
had nothing to learn from the unphilosophical many.28 Strauss' real objection
to modem philosophy was not its hedonism or relativism, but its egalitarian-
20. Id. at xii.
21. Id. at 14.
22. Id. at 24.
23. Id. at 27.
24. Holmes dismisses his subjects' claims to have been shaped by sources outside Catholicism and
Fascism as "stylized, even sanitized." Id. at xii.
25. Id. at 75.
26. Id. at 76.
27. Id. at 65, 14.
28. Id. at 79.
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ism.29 Fixated on great thinkers and haughtily indifferent to empirical evi-
dence, Holmes' Strauss defended such laughable theses as the claim that
Machiavelli caused or "launched" modernity.30 Although with most thinkers
it is a sign of the richness and enduring significance of their thought that it
sparks controversy long after its first appearance, and although Holmes admires
disagreement when it comes to praising liberalism, he sees the still-heated
debates among Strauss' students and other scholars over the interpretation of
Strauss' thought as confirmation that Strauss himself was confused about the
meaning of his writings.3'
In contrast to Strauss, a "hard" antiliberal contemptuous of liberal
protections and freedoms, Holmes characterizes Alasdair MacIntyre as a "soft"
antiliberal who evades the harsh practical implications of his critique of
liberalism. 32 Holmes' application of the contrived categories of "hard" and
"soft" antiliberals is somewhat unreliable. For example, as a "soft" antiliberal,
MacIntyre "never blames liberalism for enfeebling a country militarily."
33
However, in his introduction Holmes derides MacIntyre for the apparently
"hard" antiliberal view that "warfare breeds 'virtue"' and that martial glory
"provides a solution to the spiritual emptiness of commercial society. '34 It is
possible to save Holmes from this contradictory characterization of MacIntyre
as both a "soft" and a "hard" antiliberal by noticing that Holmes has severely
misrepresented the passage that he cites to implicate MacIntyre as a hard
antiliberal. For MacIntyre does not say, as Holmes reports, that warfare breeds
virtue. Rather, on the page to which Holmes cites, MacIntyre faces up to a
challenge to his account of virtue by acknowledging that virtue may sustain
practices that issue in evil, and offers the example that "an honorable resort to
war can issue in savage cruelty. '35 Seen in context, MacIntyre's point-that
just war can breed vice-is practically the opposite of the view that Holmes
attributed to him. But saving Holmes by showing that he distorts MacIntyre's
argument has a cost, since it calls into question the reliability of the textual
evidence that Holmes brings forward to show that MacIntyre's work is torn by
"philosophical incoherence. 36
The harshness of Holmes' criticism makes his reliability an issue.
Although Maclntyre characterizes his argument in After Virtue as a history of
ideas that chronicles the West's gradual loss of a moral vocabulary for virtue
and the virtues,37 Holmes puts forward an admittedly "unorthodox"
29. Id. at 81.
30. Id. at 84.
31. Id. at 86.
32. Id. at 88, 258.
33. Id. at 88.
34. Id. at 10 (quoting ALASDAIR MACINTYRPE AFrER ViRTUE 200 (2d ed. 1984)).
35. MAcINTYRE, supra note 34, at 200.
36. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 120.
37. MACINTYRE, supra note 34, at 1-5, 226-40.
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interpretation.38 In Holmes' view, MacIntyre's argument is a call to return to
unthinking premodern moralities, a call motivated by a fear of skepticism and
rational doubt.39 According to Holmes, while MacIntyre sometimes presents
classical antiquity as his preferred alternative to liberal modernity, his criticism
of the Enlightenment really has "religious roots. '40 Finding "sign[s] of prevar-
ication" in allegedly flawed or implausible arguments, Holmes accuses
MacIntyre of lying in order to conceal that "his ultimate loyalties lie with
biblical theology rather than with Aristotelian teleology.",41 Furthermore,
Holmes argues that for all their learning and vividness, MacIntyre's writings
are hopelessly incoherent. MacIntyre's repeated appeals to contradictory
approaches, principles, and authorities, Holmes explains, stem from
MacIntyre's craving to believe and belong and his cowardly inability to live
in the light shed by Enlightenment rationalism.42 In sum, Holmes accuses
MacIntyre not only of having committed poor philosophy but of cowardice and
lying. These are extremely serious accusations and they demand from the
accuser a high degree of credibility, the very thing that Holmes squanders
through the low standard of care that he exercises in reconstructing
MacIntyre's thought.
The work of Christopher Lasch, the next villain in Holmes' tale, throws
the "anti-technological syndrome" in antiliberal thought into sharp relief.43
Although the distrust of science and technology seems to arise from many
sources and spill over partisan lines,44 Holmes once again speaks of a
monolithic influence. In the case of the antiliberal critique of science and
technology, Martin Heidegger is the alleged source. And again, in his resolute
effort to link the criticism of liberalism to thinkers with sordid pasts, Holmes
fails to provide evidence that Lasch's criticisms of the spirit of manipulation
that underlies modem technology has roots in Heidegger's thought.45 It is
almost as if one were to describe Holmes as a disciple of Allan Bloom because
both trace the decline of American intellectual life to the influence of popular-
ized versions of the thought of Heidegger and Nietzsche.46
In fact, for Lasch, the belief typical of liberal modernity, that technology
can cure all ills, is but one feature of the general loss of a morality that
respects limits. In exploring the character and causes of this loss, Lasch
38. THA ANATOMY OF ANTLIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 93.
39. Id.
40. lId at 95.
41. Id. at 95-96.
42. Id. at 119-21.
43. Id. at 124.
44. For example, Vice-President Gore, whose liberal credentials are difficult to impugn, deplores the
hubristic manipulation of the environment through modem technology. AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE:
ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1992).
45. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 122-24, 129, 137.
46. See ALLAN BLOOM, The Nietzscheanization of the Left or Vice Versa, in THE CLOSING OF THE
AMERICAN MIND 217 (1987).
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summons the viewpoints of a great variety of thinkers, including Marxists,
Christians, progressives, civil rights activists, populists, and indeed liberals.
Holmes finds Lasch's capacity to learn from a range of traditions so
objectionable that he snidely implies that Lasch has covered up his convictions,
characterizing him as a "cultural conservative cloaked in a leftish fleece"47
despite the fact that Lasch discusses the eclectic roots of his thoughts in
detail.48
Lasch defends a morality of limits against what he sees as the steady
weakening of inner and outward constraints on human conduct. He
acknowledges and deplores the illiberalism of the lower-middle-class ethnic
whites whom he regards as the chief contemporary carriers of this morality,
but he does not want their failings to obscure the merits of their morality.
49
Furthermore, he does not restrict his analysis of the characteristic morality of
petty bourgeois culture to white ethnics. Indeed, Lasch devotes an entire
chapter to showing that the early civil rights movement in general, and the
activism of Martin Luther King, Jr., in particular, was driven by a morality of
limits. Emphasizing that the southern black civil rights movement was
sustained by a petty-bourgeois ethic, the Protestant religion, and the black
churches, which furnished institutional as well as moral support,50 Lasch calls
attention to the extraliberal sources that enabled the early civil rights
movement to summon liberalism to live up to its highest principles.
Holmes' critique fails to register this kind of contribution to the
understanding of liberalism. 5' Nor does Holmes acknowledge other aspects
of Lasch's book that his own professed standards should have led him to
admire. For example, in discussing the civil rights movement, busing, abortion,
and the rise of neoconservatism and the so called New Class, Lasch's book
presents the kind of historically informed analysis of the actual impact of
liberal sensibilities and policies on the lives of citizens that Holmes purports
to favor, but that is strikingly absent from his own book. Moreover, in contrast
to Holmes' brief examination of fragments from the texts of classical liberal
thinkers, Lasch looks at a variety of critics of, and participants in, American
political life who have reflected on the meaning of American liberalism to
Americans. One would never guess from Holmes' mocking account that
Lasch's book contains provocative discussion of Croley, Dewey, Arnold,
47. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 125.
48. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRMCS 25-35 (1991).
49. Id. at 17 ("I have no intention of minimizing the narrowness and provincialism of lower-middle-
class culture; nor do I deny that it has produced racism, nativism, anti-intellectualism, and all the other evils
so often cited by liberal critics. But liberals have lost sight of what is valuable in lower-middle-class culture
in their eagerness to condemn what is objectionable."); see also id. at 529-32.
50. Id. at 387-94.
51. Holmes vulgarizes the cultural, moral, and religious forces that Lasch found to be crucial to King's




Myrdal, Niebuhr, and others. In the end, Lasch's combination of historical,
political, and textual analysis enables him to raise a question that Holmes
evades: what is it about liberalism that has given rise to harsh criticism and
persistent dissatisfaction? 52 Unlike Holmes, whose focus on professors (whom
he regards as politically irrelevant) blinds him to the ample testimony from the
sphere of politics that liberalism is indeed troubled, Lasch seeks to account for
the political failures of liberalism and to explain the felt dissatisfaction with
liberalism that gave rise to the right-wing counter-movement of the 1980's. In
so doing, Lasch has rendered a service to liberalism that Holmes' vituperation
obscures.
After focusing on conservative critics of liberalism, Holmes attempts to
show his evenhandedness by criticizing the thought of Roberto Unger, a "soft"
or "postfascist" antiliberal who criticizes liberalism from the left. A "counter-
cultural radical," Unger "wants to poeticize ordinary life, to democratize the
rare." 53 In earlier writings, Unger sought to grasp and criticize liberal thought
and liberal society as a whole. According to Holmes, the "self-contradictory
attack on liberalism" that marks Unger's Knowledge and Politics is also
characteristic of After Virtue and Michael Sandel's communitarian critique of
liberalism.54 By exposing Unger's alleged incoherence, Holmes aims to
identify a recurring defect in antiliberalism; thus, Holmes raises the stakes in
showing where Unger goes astray.
But the high stakes do not call forth from Holmes a suitably high degree
of care. For example, according to Holmes, Unger both asserts that liberalism
"blinds us to the healthy social and psychological reality before our eyes" and
contends that liberalism "thoroughly mutilated Western societies, flattening
them into conformity with its perverse doctrinal premises. 55 Of course
liberalism cannot blind us to a healthy reality if it has thoroughly mutilated
reality. Yet the quotations that Holmes brings forward, indeed the very
sentence fragments that he reproduces in his book, reveal that this is not what
Unger argued. According to the words that Holmes adduces to convict Unger
of self-contradiction, Unger did not say that we are blinded by liberalism, but
more moderately that real life "'is obscured by the influence of liberal
principles."' 56 Moreover, Unger does not blame liberalism for thoroughly
mutilating political reality, but rather speaks more carefully of liberalism's
"representation" of and ability to "illuminate" many of the regrettable features
of social and political life it has helped to create.57 Indeed, in Unger's
formulations, as opposed to Holmes' unreliable reformulations, there really is
52. LASCH, supra note 48, at 21-39, 476-532.
53. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 143.
54. Id. at 146, 181-82.
55. Id. at 146.
56. Id. (quoting ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs 197 (1975)).
57. Id. (citing UNGER, supra note 56, at 145, 140).
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no contradiction. If one thinks that human beings are single-minded utility
maximizers, one is likely to support policies and engage in practices that
encourage others to see themselves as utility maximizers. The widespread
acceptance of dubious principles can lead to their institutionalization, which in
turn lends those principles greater credibility. The phenomenon of a self-
fulfilling prophecy is well known. Contrary to Holmes, it is not self-
contradictory to argue, as the quotations that Holmes introduces show that
Unger in fact does, that liberal principles illuminate some features of our moral
and political reality and obscure other important aspects from view. One need
go no further than the pages of Holmes' text to see how he has transformed
his opponent's defensible arguments into self-contradictory nonsense.
According to Holmes, Unger's later writing, most notably his multivolume
Politics, envisages a new politics, a "superliberalism" that aspires "to carry
liberal individualism to Dionysian extremes."' 8 Whereas Lasch attacked
liberal restlessness, Unger accuses liberalism of stultifying the human capacity
for overcoming limits and remaking the world. Whereas Lasch opposed the
Promethean strains in liberalism, Unger seeks to purify and radicalize the
Prometheanism at liberalism's core. Holmes unleashes a withering criticism of
Unger's romantic celebration of context smashing, his contempt for stability
and routine, and his utopian political proposals5 9 Here many of Holmes'
criticisms hit their target, but the distortions around them weaken their impact.
Holmes completes his survey of antiliberalism by examining
communitarianism, a currently fashionable form of criticism of liberalism.
Holmes castigates communitarians and (despite his disavowal of indulging in
guilt by association 0) "communitarian-sympathizers ' 61 for their theoretical
mistakes and historical misdescriptions. Although communitarians arise on the
right (MacIntyre) and on the left (the early Unger), there are some things, all
bad, that communitarians share. Holmes argues that communitarian critics of
liberalism commonly invoke a nebulous ideal of harmony or social solidarity
which, they say, liberal political institutions corrode, but the communitarians
fail to consider the costs of alternative nonliberal political institutions that
would secure community.62 Sketching an ideal communitarian type, Holmes
argues that communitarians suppress the fact that traditional tight-knit
communities can be cruel, invoke crude dichotomies that obscure the range of
political possibilities within liberalism, inconsistently characterize communi-
tarianism as both an alternative and a supplement to liberalism, and argue as
if "a criticism of liberal theory, by itself, entails a remaking of liberal soci-
58. Id. at 159.
59. Id. at 158-65.
60. Id. at xiii.
61. Id. at 176. Holmes uses a similar sinister locution later in his book, characterizing the distinguished
sociologist Robert Nisbet as "another well-known antiliberal sympathizer." Id. at 190.
62. Id. at 177-78.
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ety." 61 Many of Holmes' criticisms of the communitarians hit home, yet they
form an expressly generalized critique of communitarianism. 6 Holmes'
choice of method here is ironic, since he criticizes liberalism's critics for
employing an ahistorical and abstract critique of liberalism. 6
The second and considerably shorter part of Holmes' book undertakes to
correct the misunderstandings of classical liberalism that its critics have
promulgated. Holmes aims to correct historical distortions "by citing chapter
and verse, by juxtaposing hostile [antiliberal] accusations with opinions found
in a series of indisputably liberal texts. 66 His strategy, however, is marred
by a serious defect: it obscures the important distinction between merely assert-
ing a doctrine and asserting a doctrine coherently and defensibly. It is, for
example, no defense against the charge that liberal doctrines encourage moral
skepticism for Holmes to assert that "the opening sentence of Locke's Treatise
suggests a commitment to a nonarbitrary distinction between good and bad." 67
The hard question, suppressed by Holmes' procedure, is whether Locke, on the
basis of his premises about nature, human understanding, and human nature,
can credibly sustain a nonarbitrary distinction between good and bad.
By redescribing liberalism "at a sufficiently high level of abstraction" so
as to "usefully bring out a core of common beliefs, 68 Holmes evades the
serious challenges that liberalism's critics raise to liberalism's beliefs,
challenges concerning the unstated assumptions, internal coherence, and
unforeseen implications of those beliefs. Furthermore, Holmes uses this
procedure despite his own earlier attack on antiliberals for constructing an
abstract liberal doctrine not held by any particular thinker.69 Although he
complains of the "typically antiliberal reliance on double-standards," Holmes'
argument reveals that antiliberals scarcely have a monopoly on allowing
themselves liberties that they deny to their opponents.70
Nevertheless, Holmes is informative and incisive as he discusses in quick
succession a dozen "standard distortions" (many alluded to in the first part of
the book) characteristic of the antiliberal attack on liberalism.7 In Part H,
Holmes convincingly shows that liberalism is richer than its critics tend to give
it credit for. Holmes accomplishes this by placing liberal writings in political
and historical context and by sympathetically displaying the considerable
resources classical liberalism can marshal to defend itself against recognizable
and oft-heard criticisms. These are the best chapters in the book; one is
63. Id. at 178-83.
64. Id. at 176.
65. Id. at 145, 148, 153.
66. Id. at 187.
67. Id. at 235.
68. Id. at 188.
69. Id. at 148.
70. Id. at 107.
71. Id. at 189.
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impressed with the range of Holmes' learning, his lively prose, and the vitality
of the liberal ideas he champions. Nevertheless, his effort to correct
misunderstandings of liberalism raises a very serious problem for his overall
argument: the critics of liberalism whom Holmes has examined attacked liberal
society as well as liberal ideas, but Holmes counters these attacks with theory
alone. Of what relevance is it to the criticism that liberal society is atomistic
and destroys traditional bonds to bring textual evidence that John Locke "was
not unmindful of social life" and that David Hume defended liberal political
institutions while rejecting the idea of an original compact made by asocial
individuals?72 There is something decidedly abstract and ahistorical about a
defense of liberalism today that relies exclusively on the stringing together of
isolated passages from books written by theorists from the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Holmes appears to have himself commit-
ted what he regards as the antiliberal sin of confusing the defense of liberal
society with the vindication of liberal theory.
73
Indeed, there is hardly a sin of which Holmes accuses his antiliberal
opponents that he himself does not flagrantly commit in the course of his
prosecution of antiliberalism. While he castigates Maistre for his Manichean
view of the universe74 and criticizes Schmitt's abuse of the distinction
between friends and enemies,75 Holmes devises an antiliberal rubric that
divides the world of modem political thought into two conflicting, antithetical
forces, liberals and their enemies.76 While he repeatedly belittles Strauss for
teaching the political efficacy of myths,77 Holmes sympathetically insists that
metaphysically dubious or even downright false theses invoked by liberals
must be understood as useful fictions that liberals proclaimed publicly to
further liberal political goals.78 While he reproaches Strauss and Lasch for
blurring their voices with those of the authors they discuss,79 Holmes' own
rambling, contemptuous summaries constructed out of fragmentary citations
from a variety of sources often make it impossible to determine where his
reporting of opinions ends and where his sarcastic censures begin. While he
complains of poorly supported causal claims in the writings of others,80
Holmes neglects to provide evidence to support his major causal claim that
Maistre, Schmitt, Nietzsche, and Heidegger crucially determined the thought
72. Id. at 191-92. See generally id. at 190-95.
73. Id. at xiv-xv, 184.
74. Id. at 24.
75. Id. at 40-41. Holmes also disparages the distinction between friends and enemies in Maistre. See
id. at 29-30.
76. Holmes denies that he imitates the alleged Manicheanism of the thinkers he criticizes. However,
his denial of Manicheanism is overwhelmed by his powerful and repeated expression of it, as in his
Manichean characterization of liberalism's critics as "enemies of liberalism." Id. at 16.
77. Id. at 14, 22.
78. Id. at 153, 193-94, 214, 225, 234, 236.
79. Id. at 75, 125.
80. Id. at 75, 83-85, 96-97, 126, 137, 183.
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of the American university professors who criticize liberalism from a
non-marxist perspective. And, while he indignantly accuses antiliberals of
severely distorting the liberal tradition,"1 Holmes severely distorts the thought
of his opponents. In other words, Holmes' defense of liberalism abounds in the
very kinds of scholarly deficiencies and intellectual confusions that he claims
characterize antiliberal attacks on liberalism.
Holmes' reconstruction and criticism of an antiliberal tradition betrays a
pronounced affinity with the antiliberal temper he seeks to discredit, a
kindredness of spirit that both directs his polemic and is partly concealed by
it. As a result, everybody loses: liberals are deprived of a fair contest with
worthy rivals, and liberalism's critics are denied the benefits of a serious and
searching response to their diagnoses of liberalism's weaknesses.
II. THE DISADVANTAGE OF HOLMES' ANTILIBERALISM
Holmes' case against Leo Strauss is of special interest because of the light
it sheds on Holmes' peculiarly misleading distinction between liberals and
antiliberals. His case against Strauss is also noteworthy because, according to
Holmes' own judgment, "[a]mong liberalism's critics, [Strauss] remains in a
class by himself." 2 Holmes' decision to analyze Strauss as an antiliberal is
a strange one. For-as Holmes grudgingly acknowledges in the very last
footnote of his chapter on Strauss-the fact is that Strauss defended liberal
institutions. 3 Indeed, at least according to Holmes' definition, Strauss clearly
was not an antiliberal. According to Holmes, "[a]ntiliberals sneer at liberalism
and describe it as one vast mistake." 4 But Strauss favored reforming liberal-
ism from within." Holmes also insists that antiliberals "display a uniform
contempt for liberal institutions and ideas."86 Yet Strauss both openly and
subtly stressed the clear superiority of the liberal regime to all practical ri-
vals. 7 Certainly Strauss was attracted to and sought to make attractive a
tradition of thought that lies beyond the boundaries of classical liberalism. But
according to Holmes' view, liberalism focuses on institutions and practices
rather than on opinions, or at least focuses upon opinions about institutions and
practices. What compels Holmes to defy his own definitions and classify a
81. See, e.g., id at 150, 189.
82. Id. at 87.
83. Id. at 87 n.66. Shadia Drury (in what Holmes regards as a "marvelously clear overview of Strauss'
work", id. at 277 n.3) contradicts Holmes' characterization by stating that "Strauss makes it clear that he
is not an enemy of democracy." SHADIA DRURY, THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF LEO STRAUSS 194 (1988).
84. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at xvi.
85. See, e.g., LEO STRAUSS, What is Liberal Education, in LIBERALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 3
(1968) [hereinafter STRAUSS, What is Liberal Education]; LEO STRAUSS, Liberal Education and
Responsibility, in LIBERALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN, supra, at 9, 24-25 [hereinafter STRAUSS, Liberal
Education and Responsibility].
86. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 13.
87. See LEO STRAUSS, THE CITY AND MAN 1-6 (1964) [hereinafter STRAUSS, THE CITY AND MAN].
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thinker who defends liberal institutions as an antiliberal? How does Holmes
manage to mischaracterize Strauss as belonging to a tradition that regards
liberal institutions and ideas as one vast mistake?
The short answer is that instead of expounding Strauss' opinions, Holmes
caricatures them. Sometimes, to demonstrate Strauss' perversity, Holmes
perverts Strauss' meaning. For example, in a paper delivered nearly forty years
ago criticizing social science, a social science in a very different condition than
our own, Strauss saw a relativism that, "if it were acted upon, would lead to
complete chaos."8' Strauss' point was that social science research had not led
to chaos because social scientists did not recognize, or at least shied away
from, the implications of their assumptions. Yet Holmes has Strauss, in this
passage, uttering a quite different thought, namely, that the relativism that
marks social science "has led to 'complete chaos."' 89 Lifting the words
"complete chaos" from Strauss' sentence, and twisting them to suit his
purposes, Holmes ascribes to Strauss the silly, apocalyptic notion that politics
revolves around the ideas of scholars, when Strauss actually stressed that
scholars' moral presuppositions have little impact on political life.
Sometimes Holmes attributes the opinions of the thinkers that Strauss is
interpreting to Strauss himself. Indeed, by persistently blurring the distinction
between Strauss' interpretations of others and his exposition of his own
opinions, Holmes is able to attribute to Strauss any doctrine, however extreme,
that Strauss happens to be examining. For example, where Holmes attributes
to Strauss the statement that religion "breed[s] a salutary 'deference to the
ruling class,"' 90 Strauss is explicitly expounding Machiavelli's opinion of "the
multitude or the people."9' Where Holmes ascribes to Strauss the belief "that
the cosmos is 'an absolutely terrifying abyss,' wholly indifferent to our irre-
versible obliteration,"9' Strauss is in fact explaining Martin Heidegger's
opinion.93 Where Holmes imputes to Strauss the idea that "[A] law of nature
is intelligible only as a 'declaration of the will of God,' '94 Strauss is plainly
presenting John Locke's account of natural law.95 And although Holmes
writes, "[A]s Strauss put it: 'the life devoted.., to the service of others is not
the life according to nature,"' the fact is that Strauss here is not presenting his
88. See LEO STRAUSS, THE REBIRTH OF CLASSICAL POLITICAL RATIONALISM 12 (1989) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter STRAUSS, THE REBIRTH OF CLASSICAL POLITICAL RATIONALISM].
89. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 68 (emphasis added) (citing STRAUSS, THE
REBIRTH OF CLASSICAL POLITICAL RATIONALISM, supra note 88, at 12).
90. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 64.
91. LEO STRAUSS, THOUGHTS ON MACHIAVELLI 230 (1958) [hereinafter STRAUSS, THOUGHTS ON
MACHIAVELLI].
92. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 65.
93. LEO STRAUSS, SPINOZA'S CRITIQUE OF RELIGION 11 (E.M. Sinclair trans., 1965) [hereinafter
STRAUSS, SPINOZA'S CRITIQUE].
94. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 70.
95. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 202 (1953) [hereinafter STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT
AND HISTORY].
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own opinion, but quite obviously is outlining the doctrine of the poem On the
Nature of Things by the Epicurean Lucretius.96 As the instances of putting
other people's words in Strauss' mouth pile up, one begins to wonder what so
galls Holmes about Strauss that Holmes sacrifices his own credibility in a
crude attempt to discredit Strauss.
Holmes may reply, and does in fact state disapprovingly, that "it is often
impossible to determine if [Strauss] is paraphrasing others or speaking in his
own name." 97 This may be true. Yet it is also often very easy, as in the
previously noted examples. Moreover, Holmes' relentless misrepresentation
suggests that he really does not care about identifying Strauss' opinions accu-
rately. Indeed, his explicit acknowledgement that Strauss' position is often hard
to determine because of his dense style would seem to place Holmes under an
obligation to show extra care and restraint in summarizing Strauss' opinions.
Perhaps Holmes' most extreme distortion comes in his effort to
characterize Strauss as a disciple of Nietzsche and Heidegger who never broke
free of their radical illiberal teachings.98 Holmes paints an ugly portrait of
Strauss as a thinker endowed with an almost superhuman contempt for
ordinary human beings, a thinker who criticized fascism not for its inhumanity
but for its humanity: "Strauss's argument here is stupefyingly paradoxical.
Indeed, it is so foreign to our ordinary way of thinking that it is at first
difficult to absorb. From a Platonic perspective, it turns out, fascism was
excessively democratic and egalitarian. Like Christianity and liberalism, it
wholly neglected 'the best human type."' 99 Although Holmes' sensational
accusation makes a good story, it has the disadvantage of being untrue. Indeed,
a remarkable surprise is in store for the reader who consults the passage that
Holmes cites as evidence of Strauss' radically antiliberal and antidemocratic
propensities. When one restores to their context the four little words-"the best
human type"--that Holmes quotes to show Strauss' hostility, in the spirit of
Nietzsche and Heidegger, to any doctrine that bears the smallest trace of
democracy, one actually finds Strauss expounding, contrary to the spirit of
Nietzsche and Heidegger, a provocative defense of democracy.
Strauss' defense opposes the attacks on democracy unleashed by Nietzsche
and Heidegger, and stems from a novel interpretation of Plato's Republic at
odds with the interpretations of Plato that Nietzsche and Heidegger
championed:
96. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 80 (citing STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND
HISTORY, supra note 95, at 113). Holmes also cites to The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, but
the page cited deals with skepticism about the theoretical status of modem science and the decline in the
belief in progress; it lends no support to the claim he is making about Strauss' belief. STRAUSS, THE
REBIRTH OF CLASSICAL POLITICAL RATIONALISM, supra note 88, at 241.
97. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 75.
98. Id. at 75-77, xi.
99. Id. at 77 (citing LEO STRAUSS, WHAT Is POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY? 36 (1959) [hereinafter STRAUSS,
WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY?]).
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The severest indictment of democracy that ever was written occurs in
the eighth book of Plato's Republic. But even there, and precisely
there, Plato makes it clear-by coordinating his arrangement of
regimes with Hesiod's arrangement of the ages of the world-that
democracy is, in a very important respect, equal to the best regime,
which corresponds to Hesiod's golden age: since the principle of
democracy is freedom, all human types can develop freely in a
democracy, and hence in particular the best human type [emphasis
added].'0'
Thus the passage that Holmes cites to accuse Strauss of the grotesque view
that fascism was bad because it was too democratic in fact argues that
democracy is good because it is open to the aristocratic concern with "the best
human type." Whereas Holmes wants to read Strauss as an enemy of democ-
racy who disapproves of any political regime that bears the slightest trace of
it, Strauss instead offers a compelling reason why even aristocrats of various
stripes might admire and be loyal to a democracy that guarantees
freedom-that is, a liberal democracy. And whereas Holmes caricatures Strauss
as wishing to repudiate modernity and return to antiquity, Strauss provides an
interpretation of Plato that shows how an appreciation of the ancient concern
with the best regime and the best life can lead one to embrace liberal
democracy as the best practicable regime in the circumstances of
modernity.1"'
Why then does Holmes regard Strauss as a rival rather than an ally? For
far from being an antiliberal, Strauss was a friend of liberalism. While Strauss
critically scrutinized the foundations of liberal thought and harshly criticized
many of its extreme tendencies, and clearly preferred the political wisdom of
Plato and Aristotle to that of Hobbes and Locke or Kant and Hegel, Strauss
nevertheless found liberal democracy superior to all its realistic rivals, a regime
worthy of vigorous defense. Precisely as a student of Plato and Aristotle,
Strauss distinguished between the best regime and the best practicable regime
that could reasonably be hoped for under the circumstances.'02 The same per-
100. STRAUSS, WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY?., supra note 99, at 36 (emphasis added). Strauss
expounds this defense of liberal democracy several times in his writings. See also STRAUSS, THE CITY AND
MAN, supra note 87, at 130-33; STRAUSS, Liberal Education and Responsibility, supra note 85, at 24.
101. Ironically, in his conclusion Holmes criticizes Strauss for having overlooked liberalism's openness
to the individual quest for superiority. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 263. Yet this
is precisely what Strauss emphasizes in the passage Holmes cites to show Strauss' allegedly extreme
antiliberal and antidemocratic propensities.
102. Holmes obscures this simple distinction, suggesting that Strauss was a prisoner of the silly idea
that it is possible and desirable to replace liberal democratic regimes with the Platonic city in which
philosophers rule. Id. at 74. Holmes thus disregards the fundamental distinction that Strauss drew, following
Plato and Aristotle, between the best regime and the best practicable regime under the circumstances. While
Holmes saddles Strauss with the absurd ambition to seek in classical philosophy a blueprint for establishing
the best regime here and now, Strauss actually studied the account of the best regime provided by the
classics because he believed the best regime so understood could provide a standard for evaluating actual
political regimes, including liberal democracy. See, e.g., STRAUSS, THE CITY AND MAN, supra note 87, at
11 ("Only we living today can possibly find a solution to the problems of today. But an adequate
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spective that enabled Strauss to see liberalism as a distant second to the best
regime also enabled him to see contemporary liberal democracy as vastly
superior to all its practical rivals. By what definition of liberalism could this
opinion be regarded as antiliberal? Must a step outside conventional liberal
assumptions about the best life and the best regime place one beyond the pale?
Rather, isn't liberalism-with its fundamental and flexible distinction between
public and private, its openness, and its commitment to the principle that
"public disagreement is a creative force"' 3-the political and theoretical
doctrine most likely to tolerate and benefit from those who harbor theoretical
reservations about its tendencies but in practice are devoted to its welfare?
Although Holmes defends liberalism by insisting that it is a political theory
primarily concerned with political practices and institutional arrangements, he
reverses course when it comes to attacking liberalism's critics. Thus, he seeks
to establish that Strauss is an antiliberal not on the basis of Strauss' views
about political arrangements, but by pointing to Strauss' supposed fundamental
beliefs about the cosmos, nature, and human nature. For Holmes, apparently,
only a strictly liberal criticism of liberalism is to be sympathetically evaluated;
only a purely liberal discontent with a liberal society is to be given a serious
hearing; only a "perfectly liberal procedure" for criticizing liberal theorists is
to be tolerated."° A self-appointed Grand Inquisitor, Holmes searches the
hearts of those who do not fully subscribe to liberalism's fundamental
principles and basic tenets, and he passes sentence on those he finds wanting.
Defending liberalism's ideological purity, Holmes condemns Strauss because
he judges the premises and motivations of Strauss' defense of liberalism to lie
beyond the pale of orthodox liberalism. Yet, if toleration is an identifying mark
of the spirit of liberalism, and if the spirit of liberalism focuses attention on
practices and institutions and away from the "inward persuasion of the
mind,"' 5 then it cannot be the liberal spirit that excites Holmes' blinding
intolerance of unorthodox defenses of liberalism.
III. LIBERALISM'S VIRTUE
The critics of liberalism whom Holmes puts on trial and condemns are
united in the search for a moral standard and an account of the human
condition beyond the horizons of liberalism, a framework grounded in tradi-
tion, in religion, or in philosophical speculation. 10 6 For Holmes, this effort
understanding of the principles as elaborated by the classics may be the indispensable starting point for an
adequate analysis, to be achieved by us, of present-day society in its peculiar character, arid for the wise
application, to be achieved by us, of these principles to our tasks.").
103. Id. at 4.
104. Id. at xv.
105. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 18 (Patrick Romanell ed., 1950) (1689).
106. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 260-61.
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to go beyond liberalism is the core of antiliberalism. But does the spirit of
liberalism, especially the spirit of the original and enlightenment liberalism that
Holmes champions, require one to restrict one's gaze to specifically "liberal"
discontents, "liberal" ideals, and "liberal" virtues? Does liberalism demand that
"liberal" principles and "liberal" norms exclusively define our hopes, our
self-understanding, and our understanding of the world in which we dwell?
In a famous letter to John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, the embodiment of
the enlightened liberal and democratic spirit, wrote with a generous sprinkling
of Greek learning of the connection between virtue and good government:
For I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among men.
The grounds of this are virtue and talents. Formerly, bodily powers
gave place among the aristoi. But since the invention of gunpowder
has armed the weak as well as the strong with missile death, bodily
strength, like beauty, good humor, politeness and other
accomplishments, has become but an auxiliary ground of distinction.
There is also an artificial aristocracy, founded on wealth and birth,
without either virtue or talents; for with these it would belong to the
first class. The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift
of nature, for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society.
And indeed, it would have been inconsistent in creation to have
formed man for the social state, and not to have provided virtue and
wisdom enough to manage the concerns of the society. May we not
even say, that that form of government is the best, which provides the
most effectually for a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the
offices of government?'0 7
Holmes' contrived category of antiliberalism would compel us to regard
Jefferson as an enemy of liberalism for having recognized a moral standard or
a good beyond liberalism, in this case virtue, that is indispensable to good
liberal government. 0 8 Faced with this bizarre prospect, it is reasonable to put
Holmes' category aside, if only to pursue more effectively Holmes' own
admirable goal of understanding original or classical liberalism sympathetically
and in context, and defending contemporary liberalism vigorously in light of
the specific challenges that it confronts today.
Indeed, if we study the spirit of modern liberalism as Holmes urges, we
find, I think, that the vitality of liberalism depends on qualities outside the
supervision of liberal political institutions and beyond the liberal political theo-
rist's specific knowledge of the human heart and mind. To paraphrase Roberto
107. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in THE PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON, at 533, 534-35 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
108. True, Holmes offers a very brief discussion of liberal virtues. THE ANATOMY OF
ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 227-28. But liberal virtues are those that liberal regimes presuppose and
foster. Holmes considers neither the conditions for the maintenance of liberal virtues, nor liberalism's
dependence upon virtues-non- or extra-liberal virtues-that it neither actively summons nor formally
supports.
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Unger, we are human beings as well as liberals, and liberal principles and
liberal sensibilities do not exhaust our knowledge of ourselves, of others, or
of the world.109 Human beings, equal in some respects, are unequal in others.
While declaring that human beings are equal in rights and equal before the
law, liberalism does not compel us to ignore the respects in which people
differ. Indeed, some of liberalism's specific virtues-its open-endedness, its
skepticism, its reluctance to take sides on questions about fundamental
conceptions of the best life-prepare it, as few rival political theories are
prepared, to make room for sensibilities beyond the one it sustains and to
recognize the discontent it engenders.
Liberals, committed to the distinction between public and private and
skeptical of comprehensive doctrines, should be the last to equate a good
liberal citizen with a good human being. Citizen virtue is good, but sometimes,
even in public life, it must be supplemented by moral and intellectual virtues
that the more basic requirements of citizenship do not exhaust. The dependence
of the public good upon private virtue is the basis of the liberal dependence on
extraliberal understandings.
Liberalism is neither so endangered that it must demonize its critics nor
so secure that it has nothing left to learn from those who challenge through
argument its first principles and basic tenets. Indeed, as the best parts of
Stephen Holmes' book suggest, liberalism has the internal resources to mount
a respectable reply to its critics. Such a reply would recognize, as Holmes'
reply too often does not, that the critics of liberalism are a precious resource
to liberals. Probing criticism keeps liberals vigorous, self-critical, and alive to
the weaknesses and disadvantages of the things they hold dear. Evaluation
from alternative perspectives can spur liberals to restate the classical teachings
of liberalism with a view to both the enduring challenges of self-government
and the special demands that liberal democracies face today. And an informed
appreciation of the claims that moral virtue and religious belief continue to
exercise over many can enable liberals to maintain their justified wariness
about comprehensive doctrines of the good while recognizing the advantages
that accrue to liberal democracy by having in its midst those who seek to excel
and to answer the call of a higher duty.
To his credit, Holmes belatedly acknowledges in his final pages that
liberals can learn important lessons from liberalism's severest critics."0 Yet
the lessons that Holmes boasts of learning are one-sided and self-congratu-
latory. Prematurely characterizing his book as "an exercise in demolition," and
justly worried that it will be perceived as exclusively critical, Holmes contends
that by examining the charges made by liberalism's critics, liberals can acquire
109. UNGER, supra note 56, at 198.
110. THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 261-64.
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a deeper self-understanding and a greater self-confidence."' Yet the lessons
Holmes draws merely confirm his conviction of the vitality, goodness, and
wisdom of liberal politics. What kind of self-understanding leaves no room for
acknowledging shortcomings? What kind of self-confidence cannot afford to
admit defects? It is incumbent upon liberals and their friends to state that
Holmes does liberalism no favors by flattering liberal vanities. Given the par-
tiality and incompleteness of all things fashioned by human hands, it is doubt-
ful that the principles of liberalism are secure when its champions are unable
to discover anything of value about its weak points and unwise tendencies
from such a diverse array of critics as Holmes presents.
Judith Shklar loved to teach John Locke's lesson from the Second Treatise,
that liberal political institutions depend fundamentally upon trust."'
Government cannot be strong and free unless citizens trust one another and
their representatives. Yet this trust is fragile and reversible; it is easily broken
and can quickly be withdrawn. What is true of liberal political institutions is
no less true of the liberal defense of liberalism. Betraying the good will and
trust of his readers, Stephen Holmes recklessly besmirches the liberalism he
seeks to defend by marshaling in its name trumped-up charges against libera-
lism's critics and by deploying unscrupulous methods to convict his opponents
of twisted motives and incoherent thought. Liberalism deserves better. By
demonstrating that liberals are vulnerable to zealotry in the very defense of
their principles, Holmes provides unwitting testimony to liberalism's
dependence on virtue.
111. Id. at 264.
112. See, e.g., JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 183-84 (1984). Shklar noted her debt on this
point to John Dunn, who subsequently published observations on Locke and trust in two essays. See JOHN
DUNN, What is Living and What is Dead in the Political Theory of John Locke?, in INTERPRETING
POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 9, 23-24 (1990); JOHN DUNN, Trust and Political Agency, in INTERPRETING
POLITICAL RESPONSIBILrrY, supra, at 26, 35-44.
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